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H. Gregg Lewis 
This paper presents the results  of a survey of micro, ordinary least 
squares, cross-section  studies of the unionhonunion wage gap in the 
public sector with the aim of providing  mean gap estimates for that 
sector that are more or less comparable to those for the economy as 
a whole.’ The survey covers seventy-five studies2  and deals with sev- 
eral estimation problems involved with interpreting those ~tudies.~ 
6.1  Conceptual Issues 
Suppose that the concept of union status for a worker at his job is 
the following dichotomy:  if  he is unionized,  his  wages and working 
conditions are negotiated for him by a union recognized by his employer 
and he  is  covered by  the negotiated  collective  bargaining  contract; 
otherwise, he is nonunion and none of  these, not even representation 
by a union, is present. Furthermore, for the moment, I do not divide 
the unionized category into subcategories by type of union, whether 
the worker is a member of the union, and so on. 
Hence, denote union status by a  single dummy variable  U =  1  if 
unionized and zero otherwise. Let Wi  be the natural logarithm of the 
worker’s  wage  where  i = u  if  U = I  and i = n  if  U = 0, and his 
“wage” is his hourly compensation including fringe benefit costs. Then 
the unionhonunion wage gap for the worker is W,, - W,  and the mean 
gap for a group of workers is W,,  - W,,  where Wj  (i = u,n)  denotes 
the mean of Wi  for the group. The estimation problem is obvious: for 
each worker only W,,  or W,  is observed; the other must be estimated. 
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The most common method of estimation is to fit wage equations by 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to cross-section (CS) data for a sample 
of individual workers on their wages, union status, and variables con- 
trolling for some of the characteristics of workers and their jobs. Let 
the wage equation have the following form: 
(1) 
where the a’s are the estimated coefficients, the X’s are control vari- 
ables characterizing  the worker (sex, race, age, schooling, etc.) and 
his job (industry, occupation, locality,  etc.), and e is the residual.  I 
use the term microlOLSiCS to describe such equations. Then an es- 
timate  of  the mean  unionhonunion wage  gap  for the  sample of 
workers is: 
(2) 
where xi  is the sample mean of Xi.  (Of course, if  the interactions UX, 
are all omitted in fitting (l), the mean wage gap estimate A  is simply 
the coefficient urr - a,, of U in the wage equation.) 
This micro/OLS/CS wage gap estimate (2), however,  may be seri- 
ously biased for any of the following reasons: 
1. Important wage-explanatory variables that are correlated with the 
union status variable  U have been  omitted in fitting (1).  This is the 
union status selectivity problem which has been the subject of numer- 
ous empirical studies. 
Public sector unionhonunion wage gap estimates are often fitted to 
data obtained by surveying establishments-hospitals,  school districts, 
police and fire departments, and the like-rather  than households. Es- 
tablishment  data tend to be more informative of employment or job 
characteristics than of the worker characteristics in which household 
surveys are rich, and often pertain to groups of workers (such as  police) 
who are homogeneous by occupation and industry. It is by no means 
obvious to me that these differences between establishment and house- 
hold  data  produce  greater  rather  than  smaller  selectivity  bias  in 
establishment-based gap estimates than in those from household data.4 
In  any case, I  will  make no adjustment of  public  sector wage  gap 
estimates for selectivity bias, whether the estimates are based on house- 
hold or on establishment data. 
2. The wage and union  status variables may be inaccurately  mea- 
sured. Commonly, fringe benefit costs are omitted from the measured 
wage, and often weekly, monthly, or annual (instead of hourly) wage 
measures have been used. And sometimes the dependent wage variable 
is expressed in its natural arithmetic unit rather than in a logarithmic 
unit,  Furthermore, even when union  status is dichotomous, workers 
may be misclassified by union status. In  addition, in some contexts, 
W = a,  + Ca,,X, +  U[a, - a,  + C(a,, -  a,JXJ  + e, 
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especially in the public sector, accurate description of union status may 
require more than the two categories, union and nonunion. 
Specifically, in  the private sector, with few exceptions, unionized 
status (U =  1) implies that a worker is represented by a union, the 
union is recognized by the employer as the exclusive bargaining agent 
for the employee’s bargaining unit, the employer is obliged to bargain 
with the union agent, and the outcome of bargaining is a written col- 
lective bargaining  agreement or ~ontract.~  In contrast, in  the public 
sector, unionized status, as I use the term, need not imply the entire 
complement of  union  representation, union  recognition,  bargaining, 
and a collective bargaining contract. A worker may be represented by 
a union that the employer has not recognized, will not bargain  with, 
and with whom he will not enter into a contract. Or the employer may 
send an underling to “meet and confer” with the union representatives. 
Or he may agree to bargain  with the union,  but  not to enter into a 
written contract. Or he may recognize the union as  exclusive bargaining 
agent, bargain with it, and enter into a written contract. Thus much 
more for the public than for the private sector, union status cannot be 
accurately described by a single union status dummy variable based 
on union membership or contract coverage. 
For example, Ehrenberg, in his study of fire fighters (1973), distin- 
guished between three categories of city fire departments: those with 
written contracts with the fire fighter’s union (IAFF), those in which 
an IAFF local was present but did not have a contract, and all other 
cities. Let U, =  1 if  an IAFF local was present (with or without  a 
contract) and zero otherwise; U2 =  1  if the IAFF local had a contract 
and zero otherwise; and write the fitted micro/OLS/CS wage equation 
as 
(3)  w  = a + E a&;  + MlU, + (M2 - M,)U,. 
Then M,  estimates the uniodnonunion wage gap for cities in which the 
IAFF local  was present but  had  no contract, and M2 estimates the 
corresponding gap for IAFF cities with a contract. Furthermore the 
estimated mean gap &’  for both categories of IAFF cities is: 
a2  A = M, + 
UI 
(M* - MI), 
where 
3. The sample may not be a random (self-weighting) sample of the 
population it purports to represent. For example, in two of the data 
sets (National Longitudinal Surveys [NLS] of older men and the Panel 
Study of Income Dynamics [PSID] sets that include the so-called “non- 
random half”) commonly used in wage gap estimation, the sampling 
design  resulted  in  heavy over-representation of black  workers. This 
(i = 1,2) is the mean of Uj  over the city observations. 172  H. Gregg Lewis 
would not matter if the observations were properly weighted or if wage 
gap estimates were made separately by race and then averaged with 
proper weights. But if the wage gap for black workers exceeds that for 
white workers, as it appears to in these data, and if no steps are taken 
to overcome the oversampling of blacks, the wage gap estimates for 
the two races combined will tend to be biased upward. In Lewis (1986, 
159-61),  I made the following adjustment for such bias in the pertinent 
all-sectors wage gap estimates: 
Adjustment = 0.21 (MB  - awl, 
where M, - a,  was my estimate of the excess of the mean wage gap 
for black workers over that for white workers. For the NLS data I put 
M, - Hw  at almost 0.12 and for the PSID data at about 0.06. Thus 
the resulting adjustments were -  0.024 for the NLS-based estimates 
and  -0.012  for the PSID. Unfortunately, we have very little evidence 
on which to base corresponding adjustments to wage gap estimates for 
public  sector workers: Shapiro’s study (1978) using  NLS data and 
studies by  Moore and Raisian  (1981;  1982;  1983) using  PSID data. 
However, these studies show much  smaller values of M, - aw  for 
the public sector than for the private sector. Therefore, where appro- 
priate, I will make the following adjustments for oversampling of blacks: 
NLS data, all sectors: -0.02;  public sector: zero 
PSID data, all sectors: -0.01; public sector: zero 
4. A common comment on union wage effect estimates is that they 
do not take into account spillover effects from unionized workers to 
nonunion workers. It is surely true that in the general equilibrium of 
the economy in the presence of unionism the wages of nonunion work- 
ers are affected by what happens in the unionized sector. In that sense 
there are spillovers from the unionized to the nonunion sector. In what 
respect do wage gap estimates fail to take these spillovers into account? 
Imagine a U.S. economy differing from the actual one only in that 
antitrust laws have made unions  powerless  to affect  wages.  In this 
economy a worker paid a wage  Wj  (i = u if  U =  1, i = n if  U  = 0) 
in the actual economy would be paid a wage V. The wage gap for the 
worker is M  = W, - W,. His pair of union-induced wage gains, how- 
ever, is A, = Wj - V where i = u,n. Of course, M  = A,, -  A,. Let 
M,  &, and x,,  be the means of M,  A,,, and A, for a group of workers. 
Then for this group A = Au  -  A,  where X,,  in general will not be zero 
because of spillovers from the unionized sector of the economy. Hence 
if  M  is used as an estimate of the gain A,,, the gap estimate M  can be 
said to fail to take the spillovers A,, into account.h 
Consider now a special class of spillover effects that I term parity 
effects. For example, a city government whose fire fighters (or police 
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them the “same”  wages, conditional on some comparability criteria, 
as are paid to some “comparable”  group of  unionized workers in the 
same city or some other city. The reason for the parity policy may be 
fear that without it the fire fighters will become unionized. Parity effects 
stemming from such a policy are commonly termed threat effects. The 
reason for the policy, however, is not critical. What is critical is pursuit 
of wage parity between a group of nonunion workers and a “compa- 
rable”  group of unionized workers. 
Suppose that in a cross-section study of, say, city fire fighters, the 
cities practicing such wage parity for their nonunion fire fighters have 
been identified. Let Up = 1 for a parity city and zero otherwise. Then 
it is straightforward to make wage gap estimates that take parity effects 
into account, provided that there are some cities whose fire depart- 
ments are classified as nonunion and nonparity. Return to equation (3). 
For present purposes modify it by adding Up  as a righthand variable, 
suppressing U,, and writing U,  simply as U. 
(4)  W = d  +  CdJi + PUP + M,U. 
The coefficient P of  Up,  expected to be positive, estimates the parity 
effect-i.e.,  the wage gap between parity cities and other nonunion 
cities. Similarly, the coefficient Ma  of U estimates the wage gap between 
union cities and nonunion,  nonparity cities. Thus Ma  takes parity effects 
into account. The corresponding gap estimate, Mb,  that does not take 
parity  effects into account is  Mh = M,  - u,P  /(1 - 0).  Clearly, if 
Up  =  1 - U,  Up  and U are perfectly negatively correlated and P and 
M,, cannot be estimated. 
In a cross-section study of fire fighters (or police officers, teachers, 
etc.) covering a substantial number of cities in  which the fire depart- 
ments were nonunion, positive identification city by city of the parity 
cities would be tedious and expensive. Indeed, I know of no wage gap 
studies that have attempted  such identification.  Instead, students of 
the subject have used what they regarded as plausible proxies for Up. 
I think that it is fair to say that the notion underlying all of these proxies 
is that parity is practiced if and only if the environment is favorable to 
collective bargaining by the reference group of workers, here fire fight- 
ers. Denote the criterion variable by F where F = 1 if the environment 
is judged to be favorable and zero otherwise. In the Zax study (1985) 
of city workers by department (fire, police, etc.), F =  1 if and only if 
the city bargained with at least one union that was recognized by the 
city as the bargaining agent for some group of  city workers.  In the 
Freeman, Ichniowski, Lauer study (1985) of city police departments, 
F = 1 if and only if  state or local law permitted collective bargaining 
between the city and a union or unions representing its police officers. 
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if  the extent of unionism (fraction unionized) y  of some comparison 
group of workers exceeded some threshold level yT  2 0. 
For any specification of F, the city fire departments may be divided 
into four mutually exclusive and exhaustive classes as follows: 
Panty: Up = 1 if and only if  U = 0, F, =  1; 
Weak union: U, =  1  if  and only if  U =  1, F  = 0; 
Strong union: U, =  1  if  and only if  U = F  = 1; 
Nonunion, nonparity: if  and only if  U  = F  = 0. 
(The weak union class may be empty, V,, = 0. In  that event, U, = U. 
But none of the other three classes may be empty; if  any of the three 
is an empty class, P and M,, cannot be estimated from the data.) Then 
the parity effect and the unionhonunion wage gap M,, that takes the 
parity effect into account may be estimated from either of the following 
fitted equations: 
(5a)  W  = d  + Zd,X, + PUP + M,,U, + M,U,, 
(5b)  W = d + Cd,X, + PF + M,U  + (M, - M,, - P)I, 
where I = UF is the interaction  of U and F.  In these equations P  is 
the parity effect estimate and M,, (weak union) and M,  (strong union) 
are unionhonunion wage gap estimates that take parity into account. 
M,, = (U,,,M,,, +  U5MJ/U  is the mean gap estimate taking account of 
parity and Mh = M,, - opP  /( 1 -  e)  is the corresponding  estimate that 
does not  take account of  parity.  If  the weak  union  class is  empty 
(0,  = 0),  then (5a) and (5b) become: 
(6a) 
(6b) 
Suppose that the weak union class is not empty and that the fitted 
wage equation is like (5b) except that the interaction variable I = UF 
is omitted. Let bu and bF  be the estimated coefficients of U and F in 
such an equation. Then bF  is a biased estimate of P and bu is a biased 
estimate of Ma -  P. In order to estimate the size of the biases by the 
omitted variable  theorem I  assume that 0 5 M, 5  M, and I ignore 
correlations of U,  F, and Z  with the control Xs.  Then 
W  = d  + Cd,X, + PUP + M,,U, 
W = d  + Cd,X, + PF + (Mc, -  P)U. 175  Union/Nonunion Wage Gaps 
where  the  overhead  bars  denote  means  and  =  + 0,  and 
F =  + 0,.  As U,,l0 = (r/ - 0,)lOgoes  to zero, BIFgoes  to zero 
and BIU to unity. 
In going from equation (3) to equations (5a), (5b), (6a) and (6b) I 
suppressed the distinction in equation (3) between union cities with a 
written collective bargaining contract (U, =  1 in equation [3]) and other 
union  cities  (U, -  U2 =  I  in  equation [3]).  In  what follows  in  this 
paragraph  I  maintain rather than  suppress this distinction.  Write  U, 
for U, - U,  and assume for simplicity in the analysis that F =  1 when- 
ever U, or U,  is unity. Then (6b) with  the following modification  is 
applicable: 
(8)  W  = d  + Cd,X, + PF + (M, - P)UO + (MI - P)Uz, 
M,, = (If,M, +  02M2)IU; 0  = 0,  + U2, 
where Mo, M2,  and M,  are unionlnonunion  wage gap estimates that 
take account of parity. Suppose, however, that in fitting (8) the variable 
U,  is omitted. Denote the resulting coefficients of F and U2  by b, and 
b2,  respectively.  It  seems reasonable to assume that P < Mo < M2. 
Then if correlations  of U,,  U,,  and F with the X’s  are ignored, it follows 
from the omitted variable theorem that M2 = 6, + b2  and bF - U&/ 
0,  < P < bF.  That is, the coefficient 6,  of F in the fitted equation is 
an overestimate of the parity effect. This is to be expected (if Mo > P) 
since the effect of omitting U,  is to classify union cities without a written 
contract as parity cities. With the above reasoning, however, the es- 
timate  M2 = 6, + h2 is not  biased  and takes parity  into account. I 
presume that M,, < bF  + b2. 
Return now to equation (6b) and assume that in fitting this equation 
F,  but  not  U or I  = UF, has been omitted. Then it is impossible to 
derive an estimate of the parity effect from the fitted equation. How- 
ever, Mh = bu + 03bllU  where bu and bl are the coefficients  of  U 
and I, respectively. 
I  mentioned  earlier  that in  some studies F =  1  if  and only if  the 
extent of unionism y of some specified comparison group of workers 
exceeded a threshold  level yr 2 0. To simplify what follows assume 
that U,, = 0 so that equation (5b) is applicable. In (5b) let P  and M, 
be linear functions of the chosen y-variable on y > y,:  P  = g  + g,y; 
M, - P  = h +  h,y.  Then (5b) becomes 
(9)  W  = d  + Cd,X, + gF  + g,Fy  + hU + hyUy. 
A substantial number of studies reported wage equations resembling 
(9) in that they included U,  a y-variable, and sometimes its interaction 
Uy  with union  status U,  but differing from (9) in omitting F and Fy. 
According to (9) the expected wage in a nonunion, nonparity city is 
W, = d  + Zd,X,,  in a parity city it is W, = W, + g  +  g,y,  and in a 176  H. Gregg Lewis 
union city it is W, = W, + h +  h,y.  But suppose that in (9) F is set 
equal to unity so that the equation reads 
(10)  W = (d + g) + CdiXi + g,y  + hU  + h,Uy. 
Then because the coefficient g of F in (9) disappears into the intercept 
term  d + g  in  (lo),  W,,,  W,,  and,  therefore,  P = W, - W,,  and 
M, = P  + h + h,y  cannot be estimated from (10). In effect (10) im- 
plicitly  assumes that F  = 1, i.e., there are no nonunion, nonparity 
cities. But then, as I remarked early on in this section, parity effects 
cannot be estimated. 
The Zax study (1985), is the only study, to  the best of my knowledge, 
of either private sector or public sector unionhonunion wage gaps in 
which the wage equations were modeled so as  to  permit straightforward 
estimation of the parity effects. His study covered a nationwide sample 
of 889 cities in the years 1975, 1977, and 1979 and, within each city 
and year, four departments (or department groups): police, fire, sani- 
tation, and  other noneducational  groups. The city*year*department 
observations were pooled  and the wage equations included  dummy 
variables for year and department. 
Within each city and year the four departments were classified by 
union status as follows: 
UO = 1 if  and only if  some workers in the department were union 
members, but the union  was not recognized by the city for 
bargaining purposes. 
UR = 1 if  and only if  some workers in the department were union 
members and the union  was legally recognized  by the city 
for bargaining purposes. 
NU = 1 if and only if  UO  = UR = 0. 
In addition the cities in each year were classified into two categories 
(favorable or unfavorable to collective bargaining with its employees) 
by the dummy variable: F  = 1 if  and only if  the city has legally rec- 
ognized at least one union as bargaining agent for some of its employ- 
ees. Then in each year the city*department observations were divided 
into five mutually exclusive union status classes as follows: 
Parity:  Up = 1 if  UO  = UR = 1 -  F  = 0; 
Weak union: U, =  1 ifF  =  1 - UO  = 0; 
Medium union:  Urn  =  1  if  UO  = F  = 1; 
Strong union:  U, = 1 if  UR =  1; 
Nonunion, nonparity: if UO  = UR = F  = 0, the omitted base group 
In addition to the dummy variables for year (2), department (4), and 
union status (4),  the fitted  wage equation included  region, city-size, 
income, alternative wage, and demographic variables. Two wage mea- 
sures, the conventional  hourly  wage (HW) and hourly total compen- 
sation (HC) were used. 
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The estimated coefficients (in logarithmic units) of the union status 
Line  Union Status  Dependent Variable 
variables were: 
HW  HC 
1  Parity (Up>  .032  .048 
2  Weak union (U,)  .037  .041 
3  Medium union (U,)  .060  .082 
4  Strong union (U,)  .081  .lo7 
5  Mean, parity adjusted (M,)  .073  .097 
6  Mean, not so adjusted (Mh)  .066  .086 
The wage gap estimates on lines  1-4 take parity effects into account 
in the sense that the base of the wage comparisons is the nonunion, 
nonparity observation. The parity effect itself, on line I, though small, 
is  roughly  as large  as the  “weak  union”  gap on  line 2. The parity 
adjusted mean (M,) is the weighted mean of the corresponding figures 
on lines 2-4. The parity unadjusted mean (Mb)  is the estimated (weighted) 
mean wage gap between the three unionized groups (weak, medium, 
and strong) and all nonunion observations including the parity obser- 
vations. The excess of M, over Mh  is a quite modest 0.01. This is the 
best estimate that I have of the adjustment of public sector wage gap 
estimates to take parity effects into account. 
6.2  Survey of  Broad Coverage Wage Gap Estimates 
In this section I summarize the wage gap estimates that I have drawn 
from micro/OLS/CS wage equations and related data reported in (or 
obtained from the authors of) studies with moderately broad to broad 
coverage of public  sector workers. All  of  the wage  equations were 
fitted to household survey data for individual workers. 
Table 6.1 briefly describes these twenty-two studies. Column 2  iden- 
tifies each study by author and date of publication; column 3  gives the 
source of the household  survey data that were used; column 4  gives 
the year or  years to which the wage gap estimates pertain; while column 
5 is a short and somewhat incomplete description of the worker cov- 
erage of the wage gap estimates. (All of the studies exclude workers 
with missing data, the self-employed, and unpaid family workers. Most 
of them also exclude farm and private household workers.) In the nine 
studies listed on the first eleven lines of the table, the wage gap esti- 
mates for the public sector pertain to the whole of that sector as in- 
dicated  by  “All”  in  column 6. In the remaining thirteen studies the 
public sector gap estimates pertain only to the parts of the public sector 
identified in column 6. For example, the public sector gap estimates 
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Freeman & Leonard (1985) 
Johnson & Solon (1984) 
Smith (1976,  1977a) 
Smith (1977b) 
Ashenfelter (1978) 
Hirsch & Rufolo (1982) 
Johnson (1983) 
Shapiro ( 1978) 
Antos (1983) 
Antos (1980) 
Asher & Popkin (1984) 
Holzer (1982) 
Mellow (1983) 
Perloff & Wachter (1984) 
Hamermesh (1975) 
Kalachek & Raines (1976) 
Mincer (1983) 































































WM  HH 
M  48-62 
WM 
FT HH 
All  .I2 
All  .08 
All  .I1 
All  .I3 
All  .I  o/. 12 
All  .09/.  1 1 
All  .I8 
All  .18 
All  .09 
All  .03 
All  -  .04 
Pub  .09/. 12 
Pub  .I9 
Pub  .07 
Pub  .I1 
Pub  .18 
Pub  .  lo/.  12 
Pub  .I2 
GME  .06 
Gov  .04 
GE  .I4 
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-  .03 
-  .05 23  Moore & Raisian (1981)  PSID  1967-77  M HH  GE  .11 
24  Moore & Raisian (1982, 1983)  PSID  1967  M HH  Gov  .I7 
25  PSID  1968  M HH  Gov  .10 
26  PSID  1969  M HH  Gov  .06 
27  PSID  1970  M HH  Gov  .11 
28  PSID  1971  M HH  Gov  .05 
29  PSID  1972  M HH  Gov  .oo 
30  PSID  1973  M HH  Gov  .16 
31  PSID  1974  M  HH  Gov  .I4 
32  PSID  1975  M HH  Gov  .I7 
33  PSID  1976  M HH  Gov  .I5 
34  PSID  1977  M HH  Gov  .I2 
35  PSID  1967-77  M HH  Gov  .I1 
Notes  : 
Column 3:  Lines 1-8,  10, 12-18:  data source is Current Population Survey. 
Lines 9, 11, 20: data source is Narional Longitudinal Survey. 
Line 19: data source is Survey of  Consumer Finances. 
Lines 21-35:  data source is Panel Study of  Income Dynamics. 
WC  = white-collar 
M  = male 
WM  = white male 
HH  = household head 
M HH 
WM  HH = white male, household head 
FT HH 
M 50-64  = male, 50-64  years old 
M 16-64  = male, 16-64  years old 
M 48-62  = male, 48-62  years old 
SMSA 
Column 6:  Pub 
Gov  = government industry 
GE 
GME = government industry, medical services industry and educational services industry 
Column 5: BC  = blue-collar 
= male, household head 
= full-time, household head 
= Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
= public administration industry 














.09  .05 
.05  .01 
.ll  .07 
.12  .08 
.08  .04 
.I8  .I4 
.I9  .I5 
.05  .01 
.07  .03 
.06  .02 
.10  .06 
.I1  .07 
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administration  industry  in  the Current Population  Survey  (CPS) in- 
dustry classification. The public sector and matching all-sector wage 
gap estimates that I have retrieved from these twenty-two studies are 
summarized in columns 7 and 8, while the differences in the gap es- 
timates between the public sector and the all-sector are given in col- 
umns 9 and 10. 
The table presents the studies in four groupings. Lines 1-6  are stud- 
ies in which the coverage of wage and salary workers has few major 
exclusions and gap estimates are available for the whole of the public 
sector as  well as  the private sector. In this respect these studies provide 
the most complete picture of recent differences between the public and 
private sector in the unionhonunion wage gap. Lines 7-1  1 give wage 
gap estimates for the public sector that pertain to the whole of that 
sector but where the coverage of wage and salary workers is incom- 
plete: Ashenfelter (1978), blue-collar workers; Hirsch and Rufolo (1982) 
and Shapiro (1978), males 50-64  years of age; and Hirsch and Rufolo 
(1982), workers in large standard metropolitan  areas. The six studies 
on lines  12-18  pertain only  to public  administration, which  covers 
about one-third of the whole public sector. In addition, Antos (1983) 
on line 12 covers only white-collar workers and Holzer (1982) on line 
15  only male workers. The seven studies listed on lines  19-35  have 
wage gap estimates that pertain to less than the whole of the public 
sector and  the coverage of wage and salary  workers is incomplete: 
Hamermesh (1975) and Mincer (1983), white males; Kalachek and Raines 
(1976), and Moore and Raisian (1981; 1982; 1983), males; and Moore 
(l980), full-time household heads. 
I turn now to the central question of this paper:  Is the mean wage 
gap in the public sector as large or larger than that in all sectors of the 
economy? To  answer this, turn to the estimates in columns 9 and 10 
of the all-sector minus public sector gap differences for the broadest 
coverage of wage and salary workers and of public sector workers. 
The adjusted gap differences in column  10  incorporate the following 
adjustments to those in column 9 for exclusions of worker coverage 
and for overweighting of black workers. (See section 6.3 below for a 
discussion of wage gaps for the different groups that underlie  these 
adjustments): 
I. Overweighting of blacks: NLS data: subtract 0.02 (lines 9 and 20) 
PSID data: subtract 0.01 (lines 22-35) 
2. Exclusion of white-collar workers: Subtract 0.03 (lines 7 and 8) 
3. Exclusion of blue-collar workers: Add 0.03 (line 12) 
4. Exclusion of  females: Subtract 0.03 (lines 9, 11, 15, 19-21, 
5. Exclusion of black males: Add 0.01 (lines 19 and 20) 
23-35) 
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exclusions; lines 9 and 10 for excluding workers outside of large SMSAs; 
lines 19 and 22-35  for excluding those who are not household heads; 
and line 22 for the restriction to full-time workers. 
The adjusted gap differences in column 10  range from -  0.05 to 0.15 
and show little or no trend. Therefore, in judging the magnitude of the 
mean gap difference I  will ignore date differences.  The mean of the 
column  10 figures (using midpoints of estimate ranges) on lines  1-35 
is 0.044 and the standard deviation is 0.045. (This mean, 0.044, gives 
disproportional weight  to authorships providing  estimates for more 
than one date. When figures are first averaged within each authorship 
and each authorship is represented by this average, the mean is 0.033.) 
The best of the estimates in terms of worker and public sector cov- 
erage are those on lines  1-6.  The adjusted gap differences on these 
lines average 0.077 (counting each authorship once). Next best in this 
respect are those on lines 7-  1 1 which average 0.044. (The correspond- 
ing average of the unadjusted figures, however, is 0.071.) 
The all-sector  minus public sector gap differences  on lines  12-35 
may be seriously flawed, in my judgment, by incomplete coverage of 
the public sector. As I mentioned, on lines 12-18 the gap estimates for 
the public  sector pertain only  to the public administration  industry 
which employs only about one-third of the public sector work force. 
The column  10  figures on lines  12-18  average 0.008. Similarly,  the 
public sector wage gap estimates on lines 19-35  all cover the govern- 
ment industry which I presume is mainly public administration. Those 
on lines 19 and 21-23  also cover educational services, and on line 19 
medical  services are included.  I  strongly suspect that both the edu- 
cational services and medical services industries include private as  well 
as public workers. The mean of the column 10 figures on lines 19-35 
is 0.029 (counting each authorship only once). The corresponding mean 
of the unadjusted  figures in column 9 is 0.057. Thus, on the basis of 
the adjusted estimates in column  10  of Table 6.1, I put the excess of 
the mean wage gap in all sectors over that in the public sector in the 
range 0.04 to 0.08. This gives rather greater weight to lines  1 -  11 than 
to lines 12-35. 
Six studies in table 6.1 (namely, Smith [1976, 1977a, 1977bl on lines 
5 and 6; Asher and Popkin 119841 on line 14; and Perloff and Wachter 
[1984] on line 20) and one study not covered in the table (Freeman, 
1984) reported public  sector wage gap estimates by level of govern- 
ment-federal,  state, and local. (In Kalachek and Raines [1976], state 
and local were combined.) All of the studies showed that the wage gap 
for the federal government was below the average gap for all levels of 
government. The five studies that reported separate estimates for local 
governments all placed the wage gap for local governments above the 
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studies of the excess of the mean gap for local governments over that 
for all government levels are shown below. 
Study  Year  Coverage  Excess 
Smith (1977b)  1975  All  .02/.  03 
Asher and Popkin (1984)  1979  Public Admin.  .04 
Perloff and Wachter (1984)  1978  Public Admin.  .06 
Freeman (1  984)  1973  Public Admin.  .05 
These estimates average 0.03 to 0.04. They suggest that the adjusted 
mean wage gap for local government workers was in the range 0.10 to 
0.15 in 1967-79.  Thus I cannot rule out the possibility that the mean 
unionhonunion wage gap for the local government sector was as great 
as that for all U.S. wage and salary workers. 
Smith (1976; 1977a)  1973  All  .00/.02 
Freeman (  1984)  1981  Public Admin.  .02 
6.3  Differences in UniodNonunion Wage Gaps by Worker and 
Employment Characteristics 
I turn next to the question: Does the unionhonunion wage gap vary 
in the same way in the public sector as in the private sector with respect 
to such worker and employment characteristics as sex, race, and oc- 
cupation? Eight of the studies in table 6.1 provide information on the 
wage gap difference by sex (male minus female). Table 6.2 is a tabu- 
lation of this information. For white-collar workers (line 4), clerks (line 
1  I), and salaried workers in SMSA’s (line 23) the estimated male minus 
female gap difference on the average is negative and of about the same 
numerical size in both the public and private sectors. In contrast, for 
blue-collar workers (lines 5, 19, and 20) and hourly-rated workers (line 
22) this gap difference on the average is positive in the private sector, 
negative in the public sector, and the between-sector difference is sub- 
stantial. For both white- and blue-collar workers taken together (lines 
1-3,  6, 7, 15, 21, and 24) the male minus female gap difference in the 
public sector ranges from -0.10  to  -0.01  and averages about -0.05, 
while for all-sectors the range is -  0.01 to 0.03 and the average is about 
0.01. Thus Table 6.2 provides substantial evidence that the gap differ- 
ence by  sex varies considerably with collar color and sector (public 
vs.  private). There is also a somewhat weak suggestion in the table 
that the gap difference by sex varies with the ‘‘level’’ of government 
within the public sector. 
Consider now the estimates of the wage gap difference by race (white 
minus black) summarized in table 6.3. In Lewis (1986, 119-25),  I ob- 
served that the estimates of the white minus black gap difference (for Table 6.2  Wage Gap Differences by Sex (Male minus Female) (Public Sector and All-Sector) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Gap Difference 
Line  Worker  Public 
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-  .01 
-  .03 
-  .04 
-  .07 
-  .04 
-  .04 
-  .02 
-  .07/ -  .03 
.001.04 
-  .03/.01 
-  .02 
.00/.01 
.22 
-  .05 
-  .08/ -  .06 
-  .17/-  .I  I 
-.13/-.09 
-  .03/.00 
.05 
-.I3 
-  .07 
-  .13 
-  .03 











-  .04 
-  .04 
-  .04 
-  .04 
-  .01/.oo 
-  .Ol/.Oo 
-  .Ol/.oo 





-  .01 
.oo 
Notes: Column 4:  SMSA = Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area. 
Column 5: Pubad = public administration industry. 
Line 8: The range in column 6 covers three estimates. 
Lines 9, 10, 12, 15-19:  The ranges in columns 6 and 7 cover two estimates. Table 6.3  Wage Gap Differences by Race (White minus Black) (Public Sector and All-Sector) 
(1)  (2) 
Line 
No.  Study 
(3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Gap Difference 





























Shapiro (1978)  1971 
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1971 
Moore & Raisian (1982;1983)  1967-77 














Male, 50-64,  BC 





All  -.I2 
All  -.I1 
All  -.I6 
All  -  .10 
All  -  .09 
All  -  .02 
All  -  .01 
All  .01 
All  -  .05 
All  .02 
All  -  .05 
Al I  .lo 
All  -.I8 
Gov  -  .05 
GOV  & Ed  -.02 
Ed  -  .05 
Gov  .02 
.01 
-  .O1 
.04 
-  .06 
.06 
-  .O1 
-  .02 
.02 
~  .03 
~  .01 
-.15 
-  .04 
-  .29 
-  .09 
-  .08 
~  .08 
-  .08 
Notes: Column 4: BC = blue-collar, WC = white-collar, HH = household head 
Column 5: Gov = government industry, Ed = educational services industry. 
Lines 1 -  10: data source is Current Population Survey. 
Lines 1 1 -  13: data source is National Longitudinal Survey. 
Lines  14-17:  data source is Panel Study of fncome Dynamics. 185  Union/Nonunion Wage Gaps 
all sectors) tended to differ substantially by data source. According to 
the CPS data the estimated mean difference was close to zero, while 
other data sources pointed to a mean gap difference of -  0.05 to -  0.10. 
The white minus black gap difference estimates in Table 6.3 also differ 
by data source. The estimates on lines 1- 10 come from CPS data. The 
all-sector figures on lines  1  and 2 (for 1973) and lines 6 and 7 (1975) 
are close to zero. The corresponding figures for the public sector for 
1973, however, are -  0.12 and -  0.1  1, but those for 1975 are close to 
zero. 
The estimates on lines  11 -  17, based on other sources of  data and 
only for males tell a rather different story. For all sectors the white 
minus black gap difference estimates on lines  11, 14, and 15  average 
about -  0.11 in all sectors and about -  0.04 in the public sector. That 
is, the estimated black wage gap exceeds that for whites by  consid- 
erably less in the public than in  the private sector, according to data 
from the NLS and the PSID. 
I turn now to wage gap differences by collar-color (white-collar minus 
blue-collar). Table 6.4 summarizes the pertinent estimates. I have in- 
cluded Holzer’s study (1982) though the gap differences in this study 
are for salaried vs. hourly-rated workers. First note that all of the figures 
in columns 6 and 7 are negative. In both the public and private sectors 
the estimated white-collar wage gap is smaller than that for blue-collar 
workers, for both males and females, blacks and whites. Furthermore, 
the excess of the blue-collar gap over the white-collar gap in the public 
sector is less than or equal to that in all sectors except on lines 7-9 
from  Shapiro’s study  (1978).  Indeed, the figures for that  study are 
clearly outliers and in what follows I ignore them. 
Freeman and Leonard (1985) and Johnson (1983) agree that for fe- 
males the occupational gap difference is about the same in the public 
and private sectors, but for male workers the blue-collar minus white- 
collar gap difference is smaller in the public than in the private sector. 
On lines 2, 5, 10,  13, 14, 16, and  18, all pertaining to male workers, 
the figures in column 6 for the public sector range from -  0.15 to -  0.02 
and average about -  0.08, while those in column 7 for all sectors range 
from  -0.25  to  -0.15  and average about  -0.22  or about 0.14 larger 
numerically than in the public sector. Thus there is some evidence that 
at least for males, the blue-collar minus white-collar gap difference is 
substantially larger in the private than in the public sector. 
In addition to analyzing unionhonunion wage gaps by sex, race, and 
collar-color, I have also examined estimates of gaps for several detailed 
occupations, including fire fighters, police, hospital workers, and teach- 
ers. My  conclusions from this analysis (presented in the longer con- 
ference paper from which this chapter is drawn) can be summarized 
briefly: Table 6.4  Wage Gap Differences by Occupation (White-collar minus Blue-collar) (Public Sector 
and All-Sectors) 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Gap Difference 
Line  Public 




















Freeman & Leonard (1985)  1984 
1984 
I984 
Johnson (1983)  1973-76 
1973  -76 
1973-76 
Shapiro (1978)  1971 
1971 
1971 
Holzer (1982)  1978 
I978 
1978 
Moore & Raisian (1982;1983)  1967-77 













M 50-64,  white 






Male HH, white 
Male HH 
Male HH, white 
Male HH 
Male HH, white 
All  -  .07 
All  -.I0 
All  -  .07 
All  -  .08 
All  -  .04 
All  -.I4 
Al I  -  .39 
All  -  .42 
All  -.I4 
Pubad  -  .02 
Pubad  -  .06 
Pubad  -  .01 
Gov  -.I5 
GOV  & Ed  -.I0 
GOV&  Ed  -.09 
Ed  -  .09 
Ed  -  .03 
Gov  -  .09 
Gov  -.I2 
-.i0 
-.15 
~  .07 
-.16 
-.16 
-  .I4 
-  .35 
-  .35 
-  .I0 
-  .22 
-.16 
~  .20 
-  .23 
-  .25 
-  .23 
~  .25 
-  .23 
-  .25 
~  .23 
Notes: Column  4:  SMSA = Standard  Metropolitan  Statistical Area,  M  50-64  = males 50-64  years old, 
HH = household head. 
Column 5:  Pubad = public administration industry, Gov = government industry, Ed  = educational services 
industry. 
Lines 4-6:  Gap differences in columns 6 and 7 are salaried minus hourly rated. 187  Union/Nonunion  Wage Gaps 
1. Studies of fire fighters indicate that in the decade 1966-76,  the 
unionhonunion wage gap may have trended upward, but even in 1976 
it was probably below the corresponding average gap for all U.S. wage 
and salary workers. For police, wage gap estimates drawn from nine 
studies put the mean gap throughout the decade 1971-81  at roughly 
.05  below the all-worker gap. But are fire fighters and police officers 
really average U.S.  workers? In particular, if the more apt comparison 
is with  blue-collar  rather than white-collar workers, the mean  wage 
gaps for both police and fire fighters are even lower, relative to the 
more apt comparison group, than the above figures put it. 
2. For public sector hospital workers, I estimate that the mean gap 
is about two-thirds  as large as the corresponding mean for all  U.S. 
wage  and  salary  workers in  the same period.  However, the public- 
sector mean wage gaps for LPN’s, technicians, and nonprofessionals 
exceeded their private sector counterparts. 
3. For teachers, wage  gap estimates drawn from nineteen  studies 
indicate that until  the middle  1970’s, the mean gap for teachers was 
below that for all U.S. wage  and salary workers, by about 0.05.  In 
terms of work force mix, however, comparing the average teacher to 
the average U.S. wage and salary worker is misleading. Teachers are 
skilled white-collar workers. In Lewis (1986,  128 and 164) I estimated 
that the mean wage gap for all white-collar workers was about 0.05 
below that for all workers. Thus even before 1976 the mean wage gap 
for teachers may have been roughly as high as that for private sector 
white-collar workers. 
6.4  Conclusion 
In terms of worker coverage in  the public  sector, the best  of the 
public sector gap  estimates are those drawn from the twenty-two studies 
covered in table 6.1. These studies indicate that the mean wage gap 
(after adjustments for fringes and work force mix) in the public sector 
in  1973-84  moved approximately parallel to that in all sectors, but at 
a level lower by about 0.03 to 0.07. I estimate that the public sector 
gap in  this period  averaged  about 0.08  to 0.12, which is surely  not 
negligible. 
In terms of  unionhonunion wage gaps for different groups of work- 
ers, there is, I judge, much variation in the unionhonunion wage gap 
across groups of workers within each of the two sectors, public and 
private.  Furthermore, the variation in  the public sector does not par- 
allel  in  all of  its detail that in  the private  sector.  Thus, though  the 
public sector gaps are typically somewhat below their private  sector 188  H. Gregg Lewis 
counterparts, there are important exceptions to this difference espe- 
cially among employees of local governments: public school teachers, 
clerical workers, refuse collectors, local transit bus drivers, licensed 
practical nurses, hospital technicians, nonprofessional hospital work- 
ers, and undoubtedly  some others. 
Notes 
1. For reasons explained in Lewis (1986), I believe that neither simultaneous 
equations nor panel data estimates  of union wage effects are sufficiently reliable 
to be included in a survey of this type. 
2. There have been several earlier surveys of public sector wage gap esti- 
mates: Lewin 1977; Lewin, Horton, and Kuhn 1979; Honadle 1981; Mitchell 
1983; Ehrenberg and Schwarz 1983; and Freeman 1984. None of the first four 
of these surveys covered as many as twenty public sector wage gap studies. 
Ehrenberg and Schwarz covered thirty-five such studies and Freeman forty. 
The six surveys taken together cited public sector wage gap estimates drawn 
from fifty studies. For reasons stated in section 6.1, I have ignored seventeen 
of these fifty studies while adding forty-two studies that 1 presume were not 
covered in these earlier surveys either because of their newness or because 
their public sector wage gap estimates were well hidden. 
The general tenor of the conclusions  drawn by the authors of these six studies 
from the wage gap estimates surveyed was that the average wage gap in the 
public sector, though positive, was smaller than that in the private sector. For 
example, Ehrenberg and Schwarz (1983, 10) commented that: “The estimated 
relative wage differentials associated with union membership or collective bar- 
gaining coverage are typically  smaller than 10  percent and rarely exceed 20 
percent. These estimates are considerably  lower than the estimates obtained 
from private sector studies and they suggest that the relative wage effects of 
unions have been less in the public sector  than the private sector.” And Freeman 
(1984, 31-33),  referring to the public sector, stated that: “In the absence of a 
comprehensive study of various data sets, definitions of government employ- 
ees, and different models, the safest conclusions  are that the union effects 
differ significantly over time and are  generally smaller than those in the private 
sector (for any of the reasons given earlier) but are far from negligible.’’ 
3. In the longer conference paper from which this is taken I consider several 
estimation problems that I do  not deal with in this chapter. These include fringe 
benefit costs omitted from most studies, public sector hours gaps, and the skill 
mix of work forces. Detailed consideration of these problems shows that their 
resolution does not substantively affect the results given here. 
4. Pages 183 and 185 of Lewis (1986) provide some support for this view. 
5. Of course, a worker may be covered by a contract and not be a member 
of the covering union, but there are relatively so few covered nonmembers, 
except among young  workers, that it  makes little differences  in  wage  gap 
estimates whether the union status dichotomy is for contract coverage or union 
membership.  For evidence see Lewis (1986, 109-1 1). 
6. In Lewis (1986,  16-18)  I discuss several studies that I  read as claiming 
to estimate wage gains 1,  from the same cross-sectional wage equations that 189  Union/Nonunion Wage Gaps 
were used to estimate wage gaps M.  In these studies the fitted wage equations 
were of the form: 
W = a,  + ZaniXi  + Zbnjyj  + U[(a, - a,,) + Z(aUi - anj)Xj 
where W is the estimated value of W and the y variables are extent of unionism 
(fraction unionized) variables by industry and/or occupation and/or locality, 
etc. I interpret these studies as implifitly estimating V by setting U and the 
y’s equal to zero in the equation for W above, so that: 
Q  = a, + CaniXj;  A, = Zbnjyj. 
This procedure assumes that, conditional on the control variable Xs, all work- 
ers in the hypothetical economy would be paid a wage V equal to the wage W 
that is paid in the actual economy to nonunion workers (U = 0) in nonunion 
sectors (y’s = 0). I  know of  no compelling analytical reasons or convincing 
empirical evidence supporting this assumption. Furthermore, in Lewis (1986, 
38-44,  147-53),  I present evidence that the estimated coefficients b, on the 
y variables in the above equations for Wand A are quite sensitive to the choices 
of the set of y variables, the specification of  the control Xs,  and the worker 
coverage in the W equation. I am not arguing that A,  cannot be estimated; 
however, I know of no estimates of A,  that command widespread confidence 
among students of U.S. unionism. 
+ %buj  - bnj)~jl, 
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Comment  Zvi Griliches 
As always, Gregg Lewis has provided a valuable contribution  to the 
profession  by organizing  a mass of studies into a coherent whole.  I 
have two comments. First, all the studies Lewis cites (as well as those 
on private sector  union wage effects) measure the union impact in terms 
of the geometric  mean (i.e., in In  units).  Does it make  sense to use 
geometric means or might arithmetic means be more appropriate? If I 
believed that arithmetic means were more relevant, the fact that the 
variance of  In earnings in the union sector is smaller than the variance 
of In earnings in the nonunion sector (Freeman 1980, 1986) implies that 
the unionhonunion gap would  be  smaller if  arithmetic means were 
used rather than geometric. Indeed, with a lognormal distribution, the 
Zvi Griliches is Paul M. Warburg Professor of Economics at Harvard University and 
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In of the arithmetic mean equals the geometric mean plus one-half the 
variance of In earnings. As it is likely that unions have a bigger impact 
in  reducing dispersion  in the private  sector, my guess is that, when 
measured in arithmetic units, the difference between the unionhon- 
union wage gaps between the sectors will diminish somewhat compared 
to the results reported by Lewis. 
My second comment relates to the interpretation of all these esti- 
mates. What are we to make of them? Do we really believe that there 
is one “gap”  to be found, or ought we to concentrate more on the 
range of gaps? It reminds me of my own earlier work on the return to 
schooling and the search for “the”  estimate of ability bias. It is inter- 
esting, but ultimately one convinces oneself that it all depends on the 
particular set of data and circumstances in the labor market. 
What  we have  here is a  valuable array of the results  of different 
studies made as comparable as is possible at the moment. In principle, 
they should be the input for theorists, who will take them as stylized 
facts, use them in constructing a model of sectoral wage determination, 
and try to explain the differences among them as the result of different 
supply, demand, and technology of union control, bargaining, and po- 
litical  context variables.  For laying the groundwork for such future 
studies, we owe Gregg Lewis a great debt. 
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